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Abstract 
DREW SAMPSON - Seeking Harmonization: Measuring the Effectiveness of the Common 
European Asylum System 
(Under the direction of Milada Vachudova and Ingo Peters) 
 
 
This thesis is an examination of the effectiveness of the European Union’s efforts to create a 
unified asylum system. For over two decades, the EU has been taking action to ensure the 
upholding of human rights; create an efficient system via the fusion of national systems and 
implementation of EU institutions and instruments; and to better integrate immigrants. While 
there have been many new developments in the last decade alone, this thesis observes 
continuing human rights violations, insufficient coherency in the between member states, and 
a lacking effort to truly integrate migrants. In conclusion, this thesis advises that greater 
oversight and enforcement, more binding directives, and increased efforts made directly by 
the EU to integrate migrants are all necessary actions which could alleviate burden disparities 
and foster a more effective, efficient, and coherent common system of asylum. 
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Introduction  
 For over twenty years, the European Union has been taking many actions to create a 
common system of asylum. The effectiveness of the EU asylum system is largely due to 
inadequate legislation which seeks to harmonize national asylum systems via the creation of 
new institutions and instruments matched with further funding to states and existing 
programs. Faced with new patterns of forced migration and varying, counteractive national 
approaches, the EU has implemented these actions with the goal of maintaining human rights 
standards, minimizing expenditure through the convergence of institutions and instruments, 
and furthering integration of refugees. The effectiveness of these unifying actions however 
continues to be seen by many as poor and insufficient (Bouteillet-Paquet 1997; Balzacq & 
Carrera 2005; Juss 2005; Neumayer 2005; Hatton 2012). There are still many human rights 
violations derived from national behavior; the convergence of instruments and institutions 
have not decreased the difference of burden; and integration still remains an often neglected 
component of asylum. Despite the member states’ and EU’s high regard of the issue and their 
efforts, their attempts have been ineffective for a broad, complex, and interdependent set of 
reasons. Major shortcomings of the EU asylum system are: Abdication of international law 
and European law concerning human rights, aversion to a convergence of European asylum 
systems, and a lacking success of integration efforts are major components to this divided, 
ineffective system. Neither the member states nor the EU have been able to take on these 
endogenous and exogenous challenges. Further complicating this facet of modern 
governance is the reality that member state actions are often incongruent if not contrary to 
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the actions and desired outcomes of the European Union to which these states are members. 
The result of these interactions is an ineffective system of asylum which ultimately results in 
devolution of a cornerstone of modern, democratic governance. 
 In more recent times, Europe has been faced with further influxes of migrants seeking 
asylum. The main points of origin of these people are from Syria, Afghanistan, and Russia, 
with Syria having the largest increase in applications and Afghanistan displaying the largest 
quantity of refugee seekers. What is even more interesting about the recent figures is that the 
increase in applications has only risen by a mere 1% of the 11% increase in applications both 
new and pending. This most recent influx is precisely the new pattern forced migration has 
taken since the early 1990s with the only main difference between then and now being point 
of origin. In the foundational actions of the EU building a unified systems, many of the 
influxes originated from within European regions, but currently many are coming from 
outside of Europe. The most current data estimates 330,000 in 2012 according to Eurostat 
statistics (EUROSTAT 2012). This has complicated the national and supranational 
perspectives and approaches towards asylum. Because much authority still remains at the 
national level, border states have been circumnavigating much of the EU’s efforts to create 
an effective, unified system with the use of bilateral readmission agreements, aversion of 
non-binding EU legislation, and domestic border control. It is important to measure the 
effectiveness of the EU's asylum policies to shed light on how national and supranational 
factors have interacted over time.  
 Although judging effectiveness can often be a highly subjective and problematic 
endeavor, it is nevertheless needed in assessing such an important subject as asylum 
(Cameron 1986; Jorgensen 1998; Jorgensen 2004; Underdal 2004; Howlett et. al. 2009; 
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Thomas 2012). To achieve a valid, objective measurement, it is necessary for main 
components of the regime changes to be operationally defined as well as developing a clear 
method of measurement. In the case of the effectiveness of the Common European Asylum 
System (CEAS), effectiveness will naturally have a differing operational definition than that 
of, for example, the effectiveness of the European Central Bank. Though both topics may 
share similarities in what signifies a system (or group of systems) effective or not, the 
difference of inputs and outcomes remain unique. More importantly, the issue of asylum is 
and will always be highly dynamic in nature for the inconsistent set of circumstances which 
increase or decrease refuge-seeking along with the ever changing interests of European states 
remain themselves non-static entities. Thus, forced-migration creates moving targets for all 
nations which seek to provide international protection 
 A main interest of the EU is the need to protect individual’s human rights through the 
provision of international protection when warranted (COM [2008] 360 Final). This is not 
only reiterated throughout all EU legislation and communications, but is a key criterion of 
governance to which the EU and member states are bound by international laws and treaties 
concerning human rights and asylum protocol ("European Pact on Immigration and Asylum" 
2-15). While there remain many potential causes of the incapacity to uphold internationally 
recognized laws on human rights, there is no single factor which is solely responsible for this 
outcome. The non-binding legislation concerning bilateral agreements, a lack of 
enforcement, and idiosyncrasies manifested from ever changing international relations and 
migration patterns may all well be the cause of human rights violations. Regardless of this 
uncertain set of variables, the main focus is placed on the ineffectiveness of the EU’s asylum 
system in remedying these issues, not that these issues are occurring.  In this section of the 
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thesis, I will explore, deficiency of convergence measures, bilateral readmission agreements, 
differences in the degree of burden between member states (see figures one, two, three, and 
four), and lacking oversight/enforcement by the EU as factors contributing to a declining 
capacity in fostering an effective asylum system. Penultimate to the need to maintain the 
European ethos of human rights, there remain other reasons as to why effectiveness of the 
CEAS is of great importance to the EU. 
 The convergence of asylum systems would not only further ensure maintaining 
human rights standards, but would also decrease the overall costs and lessen the burden of 
those providing refuge. Through the creation of new institutions and instruments along with 
the unification of existing national and supranational systems, the EU would certainly create 
an effective system of asylum during times of high influx emigration due to warfare and 
revolution in the Middle East and Africa. However, despite these sought after benefits of a 
unified system, the EU has not been able to fully reach this end. Unbinding legislation 
concerning procedural obligations, incoherent allocation of funding to vague objectives and 
the perpetual contrary interests between nations (which in effect alters the composition of EU 
legislation) bring about a system of contradiction and usurpation. This lack of convergence 
limits the effectiveness of security, keeps costs to states higher than needed, and diminishes 
uniformity in international-EU relations. 
 Lastly, I seek to establish a lack of effectiveness of the CEAS by observing the 
failures to better integrate those who arrive to Europe in order to not only seek refuge but 
also have a fair chance in building a new life. Asylum is a three part process for the refuge-
seeker and the host country – before he/she arrives, reception, and post-reception. Seemingly, 
European nations are more concerned with the primary and secondary phase while the 
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tertiary remains often overlooked (see figures five and six). Not only can effectiveness be 
measured by observing the interactions occurring before and upon reception of a refugee 
applicant, but one ought to also observe what occurs after reception. Provision of necessary 
entitlements, such as, healthcare, employment, and education are crucial to the success of 
refugees (Farwell 2001) and decreasing the likelihood of refugees remaining a liability to the 
host state. Furthermore, public perception of migrants or how much a state and other states 
have contributed enable one to further see the likelihood of assimilation of refugees while 
also indicating the lack of effectiveness of an EU asylum system in advancing tolerance. 
Without this exploration, this thesis would be but an attempt to see how non-porous 
European borders are. If human rights standards and the European promise of a better life 
were not integral to EU aims, then such an exploration of asylum systems would be 
sufficient, but this is certainly not the case. 
  Though there are continually changing influxes of forced migrants and ever changing 
national interests, the EU’s objective attempts to create a unified, effective system of asylum 
have been ineffective for over twenty years now. Not only is this outcome important in a 
fundamental sense (providing international protection for human life), but it is also of great 
importance in regarding the capacity of the EU as a center form of governance in a 
globalized arena. The latter remains true for in the globalized world, where super powers are 
aligning and slowly disintegrating national sovereignty, such issues like asylum are a litmus 
test of effectiveness of supranational governance. If these super powers cannot successfully 
govern a matter so fundamentally important and clearly defined as protecting human life 
from persecution, murder, and attrition of liberty, then how is the world at large to relinquish 
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sovereignty in political, economic, and cultural forms additionally to the developing super 
powers? 
 In the conclusion of this thesis, I argue that in order for the EU to create an effective 
asylum system, the Union will need to make greater advancements in protecting human 
rights with greater oversight and enforcement of binding legislation, converging institutions 
and instruments with centralized institutions and instruments rather than converging national 
systems, and integrating refugees through both unified entitlements and funding of 
integration programs outside of national control. In all these components of asylum, there are 
repeated patterns of lacking capability to enforce directives, maintain thorough oversight of 
funds, converging national systems, and non-binding language in the legislation defining 
protocols and standards. Without these advancements, the CEAS will remain in a similar 
ineffective form as it has now for twenty years. 
 
Methodology: 
 In order to measure the effectiveness of the EU’s asylum system, I create a yardstick 
with which to measure the operationally defined form of effectiveness. There has been much 
research considering the effectiveness of regimes, and while measurements vary, the end goal 
is of great importance. As Underdal argues, neither the measurements of effectiveness need 
not observe the efficiency nor the differences between cost and impact, but should look to 
determine whether the goals set out by a regime are meet (Underdal 2004). Due to the 
multiple parties involved in asylum (refugee, state of entry, point-of-origin nation, host 
nation, EU institutions, national institutions, etc.), the measurement of effectiveness is not as 
clear cut as simply proclaiming the CEAS effective if it converges systems, decreases 
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expenditure, and manifests a higher sense of solidarity. As Jorgensen argues, one must 
forwardly define whether effectiveness is externally or internally measured (Jorgensen 1998), 
but seeing as asylum policies inherently aim to protect externalities (refugees) and restructure 
national asylum systems, this thesis’ measurement is naturally one measuring both internally 
and externally. The binding international treaties on human rights, EU law and political 
rhetoric concerning human rights, and the need for integration in a sociological sense are also 
inherent in the measurement of effectiveness of these institutions. Therefore, measuring 
effectiveness has three major components: Upholding human rights standards and a real 
prospect of improving the quality of life for the refugee through integration, and increasing 
the uniformity and efficiency of national systems. To exclude the human aspect of asylum 
solely to observe the functionality of the asylum system in and of itself would be erroneous 
and narrow-sighted. 
 The sequence of themes and supporting evidence in this thesis are as follows: 
1. Effectiveness of the CEAS to prevent human rights violations 
2. Effectiveness of existing and created institutions and instruments, the coherency 
of these systems, and the mitigation of burden disparities. 
3. Effectiveness of integration efforts put forth by the EU. 
Operationalization: 
 The operationalization of key terms is crucial to the understanding of this effort to 
measure effectiveness. As effectiveness is not a one-dimensional entity, the 
operationalization of effectiveness of the EU asylum system is the efficacy to maintain and 
implement a uniform system which is able to solve major outstanding issues at the 
individual, national, and supranational level. This is to denote that the EU asylum system is 
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effective if human rights and integration are maintained and highlighted, costs are 
diminished, efficiency of transnational systems is increased, and disparities in the form 
burdens to states are remedied. Human rights are easily operationalized via the defining 
criteria of the Geneva Convention and EU laws and principles, which are often in line with 
said international treaties. Convergence and coherence however are more difficult to 
differentiate for there are many forms through which both can occur (Hertog and Stross 
2011). For the scope of this essay, the former is occurs when national systems are unified 
through over-arching EU systems, for example, if national border control is relinquished to 
European systems of border control. The latter remains similar to convergence, but instead 
assesses how uniform and accessible information concerning applicants, refugees, and 
criminal activity is between nations via EU information systems. While convergence has 
much to do with the effectiveness of a common EU asylum system, coherence is more related 
to the efficiency of the system, but the two should not be mistaken as the same characteristic 
(Hertog and Stross 2011; Thomas 2012). In summation, efficiency is a key component of any 
effective system. Hertog and Stross provide in their 2011 conference paper a listing of 
operationalized definitions compiled from policy research which is quite fitting for the goals 
of this thesis. They define convergence as inherently including coherency, but that coherency 
comes in many different forms. Their conceptualization of vertical coherency is of the most 
fitting form as the EU is seeking to build coherency between the supranational and national 
level. Thus, coherency in this form is, “Coherence between a policy of the Community level 
and the individual EU member states policies in the same sphere.” (Hertog and Stross 2011). 
Integration is defined with consideration to a biopsychosocial approach to understanding 
individuals. The biological component questions whether refugees are integrated by means of 
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available healthcare and basic physiological necessities, such as water, food, and shelter. 
Psychologically, the refugee is in a healthy psychological standing and receives 
psychological assistance. As many forced migrants are leaving catastrophic living 
circumstances which have created not only major psychological problems but also 
comorbidities (see figure nine), psychological health is to be addressed by the EU as a major 
facet of the effectiveness of integration programs. Lastly, socially, integration is key to the 
success of refugees in a new society. Public opinion polls are in this sense very useful to 
measuring this aspect of integration, as well as the funding of civil society programs (see 
figures seven and eight). The utilization of the biopsychosocial paradigm is essential to this 
thesis’ measurement of the effectiveness summated by a simple fundamental truth: How are 
the refugees and host states to be successful if refugees are in poor physical and 
psychological health while having little prospects to be socially integrated into their new 
society? In these circumstances, not only do individuals lose, but the host states lose 
prospective economic assets, thus maintaining refugees as expenditure. Lastly, burden is a 
theme which appears often in literature pertaining to asylum in Europe. For the scope of this 
paper, burden is not only the financial differences which exist between states, but also the 
perceived burden of host states integrating refugees economically and civically. 
 
Measurement of Effectiveness: 
 The criteria for the measurement incorporate both the functionality of the systems 
themselves as well as the maintenance of human rights standards and success of integration 
efforts. The former criterion will then explore the convergence of systems under a uniform 
EU system, the coherence of systems in the sense of shared information, decreasing the 
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expenditure of asylum systems, equalization of burden (financially and socially), and 
creating a uniform foreign relations in the sense of a common safe third country (Collinson 
1996) listing and common readmission agreements. The latter aspect of the measurement of 
effectiveness is constituted by maintaining internationally and European recognized human 
rights standards, the reception and processing components, and a real prospect of improving 
the standard of living in the host country via the means of civic and social integration. The 
main subset criteria for the integrative aspect of the human component of this analysis is 
thereby derived from available entitlements for the refugee, available social integration 
programs, employment opportunities, and EU investments made in effort to bolster 
integration of refugees. While the spectrum of this form of measurement seems broad, it fully 
measures the effectiveness of a common EU system of asylum outcomes. 
 Another point of consideration concerning the methodology to measuring 
effectiveness is in regard to theory of migration. Without a foundational understanding of 
why forced migrants are on the move in comparison to voluntary migrants, I cannot with 
logical reason create a proper form of measurement. According to Miller, there are economic 
theories, interdisciplinary models, and transnational theories as to why people move (Castles 
& Miller 2009). The economic model maintains that people move because of rational reasons 
of self-interest, whereas the interdisciplinary and transnational models incorporate a more 
mixed theoretical understanding stating that there are greater means of knowledgeability of 
different lands and great means to reaching new lands. The difference between voluntary and 
forced migrant then remains one of cutting losses and settling for the best minimum outcome 
whereas voluntary migrants have the benefit of waiting for maximum gains. From this 
theoretical standpoint, the measurement of effectiveness is to account for the EU’s capacity 
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to provide similar outcomes for others as they do for refugee-seekers. In considering the 
effectiveness of the CEAS, it is also of importance to observe if the benefits provided by the 
EU are better than those of international systems. 
 Lastly, in gauging the effectiveness of the CEAS, I maintain that effectiveness should 
not be considered black and white, but rather a spectrum. From this sense, effectiveness is 
either in a low, moderate, or high status. Given human rights standards have improved, 
convergence methods have created a more coherent system, and integration increases, it is 
clear that the CEAS is of high effectiveness. If only two of the three, are met, the CEAS is 
moderately effective. Logically, if the CEAS meets only one criterion, then the system is of 
low effectiveness. In summation, the methodology implemented in determining the 
effectiveness is derive mainly from the achievement of goals set out by the EU, the 
maintenance of European values concerning human rights, and the domestic efforts made to 
better integrate migrants economically and civically. 
 
Human Rights and Asylum: 
 Since the end of the Second World War, human rights have been integral to the 
foundation of the post-war re-developmental era. International institutions began to develop, 
mostly composed of western states with the main goals of preserving peace through 
cooperation; in a more specific sense, this cause is also the catalyst through which the 
European Union first began with the vesting of German and French Coal & Steel. Not only 
were international institutions and third party non-governmental organizations on the rise, but 
major treaties were passed often also focused with a need for peace and human rights. The 
massive amounts of war casualties were a justifiable cause of the need for peace and human 
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rights. Furthermore, the displacement of many various groups of people played a large role 
not only directly after the end of the Second World War but also onward until the Iron 
Curtain fell, where once again a massive influx of displaced peoples were again on the move 
to a different land to call home and seek refuge (see figure ten) (Hatton et. al. 2004; Marshall 
2007; Vachudova 2007). While the groups of migrants seeking refuge or replacement have 
varied over the course of the last six decades, two aspects remain the same: Migrants are 
moving in influxes without a current or predictable rate as in earlier times in history, and, the 
responsibilities of states taking these migrants in are bounded by internationally recognized 
and longstanding treaties and laws. 
 Much of the treaties and international, normative recognitions of human rights have 
even been further integrated into domestic law. In the case of the EU, human rights and rule 
of law are cornerstones of the democratic foundation upon which the EU (and subsequently) 
the member states are built. Looking deeper into EU political rhetoric, one can easily observe 
the focus put on a need for maintaining human rights in its actions and outwardly projected 
positions on current international affairs. However much valuation the EU gives to the 
maintenance and recognition of human rights, its rhetoric remains overshadowed by failures 
in the EU asylum system, whereby bilateral agreements, improper use of safe third countries, 
loosely-based procedural directives, and lack of convergence all contribute to the 
susceptibility of human rights violations. 
 
Protocol Directives, Bilateralism, and Enforcement 
 The first observable factor contributing to a lax approach to upholding human rights 
is found in EU directives and legislation of the procedural and collective objectives presented 
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throughout the last half of a decade. Because much of the legislation is non-binding, in that 
the EU often invites member states to take part in these convergences in the spirit of 
solidarity (C115/01), nations can easily circumnavigate EU approaches. As this thesis will 
later explore, these national differences in interests, and thus behavior, are not the sole cause 
of ineffectiveness of EU asylum objectives. Furthermore, the EU directives are naturally 
passed through a system which ultimately is run by the heads of states. If the European 
Parliament had more political power, it could very well be that the legislation passed would 
be more binding and impose a uniform solidarity instead of simply inviting member states to 
act as the EU desires and the current influxes of forced migrants need. Again, effectiveness 
in the form of vertical coherency would mean that national policies would be in line with 
policies at the EU level. The non-binding nature of the EU legislation is too open for 
coherency to occur which has resulted in nations behaving within their own self-interests. 
While one would not presume nations are seeking to push applicants back to third countries 
or points of origin, the EU legislation is not binding enough to prevent this. 
 The second aspect of the human component of an ineffective, common asylum 
system is in the (still) open nature of bilateral agreements in EU legislation. As the EU 
cannot simply force nations to relinquish sovereignty in this sense, many nations which 
experience more burden than those countries of the interior or northern regions of Europe are 
creating bilateral agreements. These bilateral agreements make it easier for states to 
circumnavigate non-refoulment clauses in international an EU law, and what further 
complicates matters of oversight and enforcement is that many of these agreements can and 
do occur in informalized settings (Cassarino 2007). A recent case of this, and by far the most 
publicized, is that of the Italian-Libyan relationship. Libya has become a popular point of 
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transition for on average 80,000 African migrants annually looking to flee their homelands 
(Hamood 2008). Since Italy is of closest proximity, it is sensible that they would receive 
most of the forced migrants looking to enter Europe. In response to this, Italy has created 
specific bilateral readmission agreements which abdicate the obligations held by the Geneva 
Convention and EU law. As a direct result of high influx, the conditions in which asylum-
seekers live in are below proper terms). Human rights violations occur in southern Italy not 
only in the bilateral readmission agreements which are related directly to non-refoulment 
criteria in international law, but are also occurring in mass deportations and inaccessible 
health services (Andrijasevic 2009). The bilateral agreements which have been set up seek to 
usurp international and EU law by creating vague, ambiguous terms with which Italy can 
abdicate responsibility to take a refugee-seeker into protection upon first arrival. These 
human rights violations are not just occurring in Italy, but in other countries on the perimeter 
of European land. The border between Greece and Turkey also experiences many influxes. 
The situation with Turkey however remains different from Libya in one major way which is 
that Turkey is often viewed as a safe third country whereas Libya is not commonly seen in 
such a light. Because of this difference, it has been easier for Greece to abdicate 
responsibility to take in and process applicants. Because the relation between exit and 
entrance country is not so clear cut as the Italy-Libya relationship, push backs not only are a 
matter of international law but also the intertwinement of polities at the national level (Gil-
Bazo 2006). To further complicate issues of international law and relations, the EU has also 
played a part in human rights violations it claims to fight against. In 2010, there was an 
influx of irregular, illegal land and maritime border crossings. In response to this influx, 
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Greece requested additional assistance from FRONTEX. As Carrera and Guild argue in their 
article examining the 2010 push back by Greece and FRONTEX: 
The presentation of Frontex Operation RABIT 2010 as ‘the solution’ to the situation at the 
external borders of Greece with Turkey illustrates the kind of responses that the EU priorities 
in situations such as those taking place in Greece: more security (FRONTEX) and not going at 
the heart of the issue, which is that of human rights protection of refugees and undocumented 
migrants. (Carrera & Guild 2010) 
 
The non-binding EU legislation, remaining sovereignty to implement bilateral readmission 
agreements, and varied conceptualizations of which countries are considered as safe third 
countries all have made a landscape where human rights violations are occurring. As long as 
the EU does not directly assess the issues concerning the coherency of the CEAS while 
continuing to grant states with these open-ended options, these violations will continue to 
occur. 
 Thirdly, ineffectiveness concerning the maintenance of human rights is seen in both 
an insufficient method of oversight and a subsequent lack of enforcement. Again, key to this 
problem are issues of sovereignty and structural reconfiguration. While there has been much 
progress made in the sense of continual funding (see figure twelve) to asylum causes and 
structural changes at the European level of governance, there remains a problematic 
obstinacy at the national level wherein states do not (and are not obliged to) relinquish 
sovereignty to the supranational institutions via convergence of systems and border control. 
Oversight is necessary in a fundamental sense but as national transparency is not obligatory, 
the EU and third party organizations have a difficult time maintaining oversight.  Without 
observation and enforcement, funds cannot be properly allocated and tracked. Enforcement is 
necessary in the sense of the proper and most effective use of the funds as well as decreasing 
illegal or gauche actions. In the latter, this aspect of the need for enforcement is clear not in 
just achieving a coherent, effective CEAS, but in also protecting the rights of those fleeing 
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their points of origin. Later in this thesis, I explore furthermore the precise weaknesses in 
institutions and instruments which create this incapacity for oversight and enforcement. 
 Lastly, there is a large issue with the institutional uniformity of the EU as an 
international actor. While superficially this aspect seems unconnected to the human rights 
aspect of the EU asylum system, it remains a final component of ineffectiveness. This is not 
to denote that the Union should see all refugee applicants as equal but has more to do with 
international relations. The need for a safe third country listing is as crucial to the human 
rights component as the bilateral agreements component. The bilateral agreements issue is 
the same problem as the safe third country issue, in that they both defy uniformity of action 
with the only difference between the two being at which level of governance this abdication 
is occurring, respectively at the national and supranational level. To delve further into this 
matter, one can easily observe that member states would naturally be inclined to abdicate 
responsibility and refute invitations in the name of solidarity when the EU is doing precisely 
the same act with a non-uniform approach to international relations as the member states are 
doing.  
 
Regimes, Institutions, and Instruments of the EU: 
 Not only has the EU asylum system failed to achieve a higher standard of human 
rights, but the system also fails to achieve an equalized distribution of burden between 
member states and does little to create a more cost efficient system. In large part, the EU 
asylum system is not only an attempt to manage the poor national handling of forced 
migrants, but it is also to diminish financial inequalities, converge systems into a more 
coherent one in order to decrease expenditure, and lastly to create a system which more 
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effectively secures the borders. While the EU has indeed created many new structures (ERF, 
EIF, EASO, and the protocol directives), the overall effectiveness of these new approaches 
have not rendered any better outcomes than those of the past twenty years. Member states 
still believe that they each absorb their fair share (see figures one, two, three, four and eleven 
[many nations have felt they have cared their fair share but in comparison with the most 
recent data, there are still major differences between application rates and acceptance rates), 
the EU still has problems enforcing new directives, and there has been further investment 
into the asylum system where one could infer that the CEAS is not any more cost efficient 
than it has been before. 
 Three main objectives the EU has sought to achieve by converging asylum systems 
are to diminish the difference in burden to states, create a less costly expenditure towards 
asylum practices, and to better secure European borders (COM [2008] 360 Final). 
Furthermore, economic welfare is of great concern to member states, in that each is trying to 
maximize the benefit of increased labor supply via the form and context of EU legislation. To 
these ends, many changes have occurred in the last decade, and furthermore, the EU is 
developing more approaches for the next decade. In the last ten years, the EU has made 
institutional changes in the sense of which members and institutions have authority in asylum 
issues; implemented a new set of directives and procedural legislation concerning reception, 
qualification, processing, and post-reception responsibilities; is working to create a central 
institution for claims and processing (EASO);  created the European Refugee Fund; and 
enacted FRONTEX and further developed advanced information systems (EURODAC); 
although these systems denote a high regard and care the EU has to the issue of asylum, the 
success of these approaches have not fully resolved disparities between states nor have they 
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created a more efficient system. The latter is of high importance solely because, as previously 
mentioned, a characteristic trait of an effective system is a system which is also efficient. 
 
Restructuring and Transference of Authority 
 Throughout the period of 2000-2010, there was much effort put forth to change whom 
has the leading authoritative role concerning asylum. The greatest of these changes was seen 
with a transition of asylum from the second pillar to the first pillar. While the Lisbon Treaty 
abolished this pillar system entirely, this shift of authority is still of relative importance to 
understanding the effectiveness of the EU asylum system. On the one hand, the movement 
into the first pillar shows an increase of priority of international protection. On the other 
hand, the transition may well further abdicate and confound a direct authority over the 
subject. In essence, the transition from second pillar to first pillar, then followed by the 
abolishment of the pillar system as a whole denotes a constant state of change relative to the 
competencies governing asylum. Despite the effort to increase the priority and importance of 
asylum, the last decade has seen a perpetual shift in authorities. Therefore, a constant shift in 
competencies has occurred. Furthermore, when one observes the increased bilateral 
approaches made by states at the national level, one can see that the normative aspects of 
governance are becoming more path-dependent, in that more restrictive action against 
asylum-seekers is becoming a common denominator (Byrne et. al. 2004). States on the 
border do not want to take on burden simply due to geopolitical circumstances and the 
interior states do not wish to pay more to equalize burden. Lastly, concerning the issue of 
outstanding authority, one should consider the intertwinement of polities spanning from 
regional to international. A highly complicating issue comes in the form of maritime 
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movement where polities often have the open interpretation of laws since much of maritime 
geopolitical authority is still without a governing body (Haddad 2008; Moreno-Lax 2011). 
Since much of the EU legislation concerning asylum is written in a manner of invitation, 
cooperation, and a spirit of solidarity, this has devolved the obligation and effectiveness of 
the governing departments not due to one department or branch governing better than the 
other, but due to an inconsistent coherency between the many parties involved in creating an 
effective, European system of asylum. 
 
Convergence through Legislation 
 Beyond the realm of institutional changeover and restructuring, the EU has in the last 
decade implemented an omnibus protocol system which ranges topics from reception and 
qualification criteria to emergency actions and integration/resettlement clauses. These 
common guidelines are but once again a step in the right direction towards creating a unified 
system of asylum, but there remain major issues concerning the logistics, semantics, and 
enforcement of these baseline directives. The directives will go into effect in the next years 
and therefore the impact/outcome components of these actions are still in a larger sense 
ungraspable. However, when one observes the content, stipulations, and enforcement 
capacities set out by the governing authorities, one can already see foreseeable problems and 
shortcomings of the legislation (Peers 2012). In an overall understanding of why this has 
occurred, one should not look further than the structural processes which have drafted and 
passed these directives; due to the specific political structuring of the EU branches of 
government, it is clear why such a low common denominator has been reached, thus, 
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providing a uniform but lacking set of directives, non-binding by nature and without much 
enforcement on behalf of the EU.  
 Some main points the EU directives set out have much to do with waiting periods, 
provisions of goods and services, and a general foundation for qualification. The waiting 
period which will be implemented is reasonable in determining that now processing should 
last longer than 6 months. This directive is especially fitting considering that most of the 
influx states are experiencing today are not of new migrants, but those who still have pending 
applications (I ask myself how one then can say this is an influx…). The directives 
concerning provision of goods and services contain much about the general provisions, but 
again, without oversight and enforcement of these directives, states are able to 
circumnavigate the quality and extent to which these goods and services are provided. As this 
section will later explore, a weakness in the directives concerning this area leave states in too 
much control as to what they provide asylum-seekers. Lastly, the directives also speak to 
qualification. This is by far the soundest aspect of the directives in that they set out a 
foundation which all nations can follow in discerning whether or not an asylum-seeker 
qualifies for asylum, regardless of which state he/she has entered or applied to. Regardless of 
the fact that the Geneva Convention has set these qualifications since 1951, the EU directives 
modernize qualifications in times which are greatly different from the middle 20
th
 century. 
Overall, the intention of the directives is constructive, but in many regards, these directives 
mean nothing if there is insufficient oversight or enforcement of these directives. 
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The New Institutions and Instruments 
 Structural reconfiguration and the new directives are only one side of the convergence 
efforts made by the European Union. There have also in the last decade been new institutions 
created to directly assess newer obstacles and objectives to the issue of asylum. The 
European Asylum Support Office (EASO) came into fruition in 2010 and is to be a unifying 
entity between the EU and national level governances. EASO’s main approach to unifying 
these polities is through informational exchanges and, in a secondary sense, through support 
in processing asylum cases (“Annual Report on the Situation of Asylum in the European 
Union 2012” 2013). Lastly, of due importance is the fact that the EU truly does retain much 
authority over the department which denotes an opportunity to express and implement mainly 
European perspectives and actions respectively. How the EASO plays into the measurement 
of effectiveness of the CEAS lies in the limited expanse of the department in the sense that it 
does not act in lieu of national processing centers. While arguably the department has not 
been in existence long enough for it to have clear spill-over effects and override path 
dependencies of national asylum systems, this truth remains an important piece of evidence 
of the suppressed authoritative powers of the EU in forming a unified system of asylum. In 
essence, the department is adding to effectiveness by increasing the overall coherency of 
national systems with the spread of information concerning influxes and migration patterns, 
but the small parameters of processing leave the national systems able to override the EU 
system. In this sense, if the department cannot override the national systems, then EASO is, 
much like FRONTEX, an underused institution. 
 Not only are the governing institutions playing a key role in the ineffectiveness of the 
CEAS, but instruments are also of great affect in the matter. Another recent development 
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towards converging systems is the European Refugee Fund (ERF). This fund is manifested 
through national allocation of funds and is therefore available to all contributing states. The 
main purpose of this instrument is to assist in decreasing the difference of financial burden 
between states of high and low migration flows. More so, the fund exists to better ensure that 
refugees have access to legal and social assistance as they apply and are processed. The most 
recent update of the allotted funds is from the time period of 2008 until 2013, wherein the 
fund had accumulated 630 million euros for disbursement in said time period. While this 
amount is indeed a great increase from the last overall funds made available to states, again 
the key to effectiveness is not only the availability of needed funds but the utilization of 
funds. 
 While the ERF is a step in the right direction, there remain some major flaws which 
hinder its capacity to truly create a strong affect in regard to the burden issue. Control of the 
money is of a main concern because as mentioned previously, both the EU and national 
levels have proven that a general consensus towards unified action is often hard to meet, 
thus, simply applying a slush fund for vague and ambiguous expenditures does not imply 
effectiveness (Thielemann 2005). This is by no means to detract from the existence of the 
funds, which is indeed a positive change and beneficial factor. How the money is utilized and 
by whom is of great concern in observing the effectiveness of such an instrument. Since the 
funds are distributed through shared competencies, there is a lacking uniformity in allocation 
of funds. For example, many nations have both a financing department in control of the 
contribution and allocation of funds per the request of a separate department dealing with 
migration solely. Because of these discrepancies, coherency is diminished and there is much 
room for the varied interpretation of interests between national departments. 
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 Not only are there issues with coherency in the mechanisms fueling the ERF, but 
there is also an issue pertaining to the usage of funds. According to the structuring of this 
instrument, there are baseline funds and contributions which are created by an omnibus of 
statistical data pertaining to the amounts of first applications, granted protection, migration 
flows, resettled peoples, and number of effected returns. While these criteria are certainly 
proper in assessing the needs of various nations, the EU has decided that these funds 
provided by the ERF are to be run through national programs instead of through the 
European Asylum Support Office or another EU institution. Because of this decision, one can 
infer that the use of funds is only as good as the national offices which control asylum, and, 
since the states with the most need will receive the highest amount of funding, this action 
further funds deficient systems. As mentioned in the previous section, Italy has had major 
problems in maintaining a migration system which adheres to both international and EU law, 
resulting in what many have justifiably deemed as contributing to human rights violations. 
For the 2014-2020 set of funding, Italy will receive over 325 million euros, which is second 
only to the UK (“Annual Report on the Situation of Asylum in the European Union 2012” 
2013). How Italy will utilize these funds through national means is of great concern to all 
invested parties. Simply providing funds not only does not prove an effective system, but can 
clearly exasperate outstanding problems found in the national level, which the CEAS in 
many senses was created to resolve. 
 The current set of instruments the EU has at its disposal is not just in the form 
funding, but also in the form of direct assistance. As a final example speaking to the area of 
convergence in instrumental terms is observable in the European Agency for the 
Management of Operational Cooperation at the External Borders of the Member States of the 
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European Union (fortunately and commonly known as FRONTEX). The agency has been in 
action for more than eight years now, but the overall impact of it in relation to the 
effectiveness of EU instruments is yet to be seen as highly effective. A main foundation for 
this argument is derived not from the institutional functionality of the agency itself, but 
rather, the EU legislation concerning in which manner the agency is to be used. Again, the 
cause of this problem is founded in the vague, abdicating nature of the EU legislation 
wherein the EU cannot seize full authority over the use of the agency. Instead, the EU has 
drafted legislation which states the use of FRONTEX is dependent on the request of 
additional manpower by nations either experiencing influx in illegal or dangerous migration 
patterns or in times of emergency. Most of the use of FRONTEX is in the areas of 
longstanding, high patterns of entry, namely, Greece and Italy. If the use of FRONTEX were 
of the discretion of the EU itself, then uniformity and convergence of systems would be 
much more effective rather than leaving each nation to utilize its own form of border control 
based on its own protocol legislation. In a larger scope, one can also argue that the agency is 
a waste of funds since the EU does not fully have control over the use of the agency, thus, the 
agency remains a passive entity to be funded constantly but used seldom. 
 In the sense of informational competencies of the EU, which is clearly of great 
importance in fighting illegal and nefarious forms of migration, coherency is institutionalized 
in the form of European Dactlyoscopy (EURODAC), or in a more understandable form, the 
information database of fingerprints and biometrics compiled by the Commission. In one 
sense, the availability of this information is increasingly expanded to various crime fighting 
entities at the regional, national, and EU level, but in another sense, this instrument can also 
counteract the common directives established through the means of red flagging individuals. 
25 
 
In effect, if one is not processed according to the common directives set out by the EU, then 
this omniscient system will make reversing an error of processing much more difficult. 
Further complicating matters, the EU’s guarantee of free legal aid has been insufficient 
mainly due to lacking funds (“Annual Report on the Situation of Asylum in the European 
Union 2012” 2013). Without legal assistance, language assistance, or a common appeals 
system, these technologically advance security systems create a deficient relationship 
between applicant and host country. In order for the informational systems to be truly 
effective, there must also be convergence of national systems as a foundation to which this 
information/legal system would then truly benefit the greater goods the EU wishes to obtain. 
 With the many changes which have occurred structural in the last years leading up to 
the second phase of the CEAS, there have clearly been path-dependencies which are too 
difficult for the EU to break. Though the creation of new instruments and institutions are 
indeed examples of the European prioritization of asylum, their effectiveness in bolstering an 
effective, unified system continues to be lacking. The provision of more binding policies, 
more specific use of funds, and a greater focus on the need for oversight and enforcement are 
all solutions to the structural problems the CEAS is experiencing. 
 
Integration and Post-Asylum Processing Challenges: 
 The last measurement of effectiveness of the EU asylum system I define are the 
efforts and implementation of integration programs, the degree to which EU authority affects 
civic assimilation, and the influence of the EU on national perspectives regarding refugees 
and state obligation. Without this measurement, inferring the effectiveness of the EU asylum 
system remains solely focused on before and during the process of application; what occurs 
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after the acceptance or denial of asylum to an applicant is a defining feature of the institution, 
for if a refugee cannot achieve a safer, better quality of life, then why have the institution of 
asylum at all? 
 
The Biopsychosocial Approach of Measuring Health 
 In the field of psychology, a paradigm of understanding the general health of an 
individual and the contributing factors to one’s health is known as the biopsychosocial 
paradigm. Though this approach to understanding individual health is often utilized in 
addiction rehabilitation methods, it can also be implemented to assess the health of any 
individual. For the scope of this essay, one should not delve too deeply into the philosophical 
aspects of why this argumentation holds true, but suffice it to say, we all have vices, seek 
homeostasis, and work within this paradigm for the influences of our behavior (and thus 
health) are both internally and externally derived while most certainly interdependent upon 
another. The biopsychosocial approach claims that an individual’s behavior is derived from 
biological influences (neurological, physiological, and organ systems), psychological 
influences (capacity of the brain and nervous systems, presence of psychological pathologies, 
and personality traits), and social influences (exogenously and endogenously derived social 
interactions; dyadic, familial, and interpersonal relationships; and integration/belongingness 
factors) (Frankel 2003). All of these influences attribute to the behavior of an individual, the 
overall health of an individual, and his/her interaction with other people. 
 In assessing the effectiveness of the EU efforts towards creating a better, more 
effective asylum system, it is of great use to utilize this paradigm in measuring the provisions 
of states to asylum seekers. Redundant as it may be, one should keep in mind that forced 
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migrants are not typically in the best of health in any of these realms of the paradigm. 
Refugees may be forced to leave because of biological reasons, such as agricultural 
deficiency or governances withholding resources resulting in starvation and other biological 
comorbidities derived therefrom. Norredam et. al. conducted research concerning the 
accessibility of healthcare to asylum-seekers upon entry and discovered that nearly half of 
member states are providing healthcare only in emergency circumstances and that there are 
practical barriers, such as language, which often decrease the accessibility of healthcare to 
asylum-seekers (Norredam et. al. 2005). In many other cases, refuges are fleeing warfare, 
persecution, and other acts inflicting stress disorders, depression, and many other 
psychological reactions to such atrocities. To only sparsely offer emergency care does not in 
large apply to those with psychological pathologies, and from this standpoint, states are only 
providing a bare minimum of health services. And lastly, one should not overlook the social 
aspect of the paradigm in forced migrants. Many have been separated or displaced from 
friends and families, witnessed loved ones tortured or murdered, and have lost their sense of 
security and belongingness in their point of origin. Social integration is not only a matter of 
individual health and prosperity as a citizen to a host country, but is also a security issue. 
Immigrants are inherently prone to ethnocentric violence. Without civil society and social 
integration programs, this form of conflict is not one which can be remedied with only 
policing, for this too is a liability to the state and does not truly deal with the core issues 
(Krell et. al. 1996). In order for the directives concerning protocol to increase effectiveness 
of the CEAS, the baseline directives and allocation of funds need to be better implemented to 
better care for the biological, psychological, and social health of all asylum-seekers. One 
ought to keep in mind that rarely is the case that a forced migrant has problems in only one 
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aspect of the paradigm, resulting in both the need for healthcare services and an often deeply 
complicated set off pathologies which may well be very difficult to cure (Farwell 2001). In 
measuring the effectiveness of the EU asylum system, it is of great importance to not only 
observe the human rights and convergence issues, but also to observe what the EU is doing to 
integrate asylum seekers in economic, social, and health terms.  
 
Integration Efforts of the EU 
 What is most perplexing of the entire issue of European asylum efforts is that the EU 
is often hindered if not entirely stopped from taking full authority of the area of refuge due to 
shared national interests to retain sovereignty in this area. More so, by taking authorities over 
solely EU level institutions, the spread of norms is increased in the sense of collective 
perception and spill-over effects, “Norms research suggests that the origin of many 
international norms lie not in the preexisting state interests but in the strongly held principled 
ideas (ideas about right and wrong) and the desire to convert others to those ideas (Sikkink 
1998). A component which the EU could indeed strengthen without much national 
contradiction is in the area of integration. The creation of integration programs, basic 
fundamental entitlements via the ERF, and influencing national perspectives are all 
approaches which the EU could implement without member states having much political 
power to oppose these actions. Unfortunately, much of the focus is placed on issues directly 
related to before and during an applicant is processing, and, to the domestic issues explored 
in the second section. 
 First and foremost concerning this aspect of the EU’s attempts to reconcile integration 
of non-EU persons, one should consider the EU directives of protocol. Within this legislation 
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are directives concerning the entitlements, rights, and necessities of refugees. What is more 
complex about this facet of integration is the integration of refugees. Despite the general 
animosity held against refugees, While refugees do not provide as abundantly to a host 
country economically (this is not to say they never, but rather are less likely than one who 
chooses to migrate), refugees provide states with reinforcement of the values modern, 
democratic states maintain and project socially (Hatton 2004). In other words, refugees are 
clear evidence that the society both citizens and refugees live in is indeed a free, peaceful, 
and prosperous land. To further extend this argumentation, one should consider the dynamics 
which are tied to economic and civic assimilation. Without social inclusion, how could one 
then presume that an individual can or would desire to contribute to the collective whole 
economically or civically? 
 Directly related to this aspect of assimilation and inclusion are the possibilities of 
benefits and opportunities refugees can receive after gaining asylum. Relative to the issue of 
burden, integration provides a further conceptualization wherein states that face the influxes 
at the border are not the only states experiencing burden. There are also the states with high 
acceptance rates, and to these states, integration is a far more important aspect of an effective 
asylum system (Marshall 2007). The EU has worked to set out basic timelines for processing 
which in turn affect the right to work, receive basic health services, and secure a sound 
means of shelter. Furthermore, the EU has set out access to vocational training regardless of 
whether or not he/she has access to a labor market, basic healthcare and screenings are to be 
provided upon reception, and that educational services are to be granted relative to national 
trends. While these are a good foundation for assimilation following the biopsychosocial 
paradigm, they fall short of true effectiveness because of both the differences in social 
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provision of member states and the unbounded nature of the EU directives. A key example of 
this is found in the legislation of the baseline directives themselves. In the case of receptions 
needs, the EU has made two negatively affecting mistakes: The right for nations to provide 
applicants with nearly the same benefits that nationals receive and the right to ask for a 
refund of these provisions the protected receive. The former is problematic in that political 
economies differ from one another; thus, one state may provide nationals with more benefits 
than other nations provide their citizens. From this standpoint one must observe the 
difference of social benefits from the states with high influx migration from the states with 
low influx migration. States which have high influx, namely those of the southern region of 
Europe, do not have systems of benefits which work on a sheer individual basis and, more 
importantly, the benefits are more so buy-in systems whereby one needs to contribute before 
merely receiving benefits (Ferrera 1996). This circumstance then makes for a lower yield of 
benefits to asylum seekers who do not have the right to contribute thus they will receive an 
inadequate form of assistance, which he/she may very well have to reimburse the state for 
anyway. The latter condition remains problematic because the insufficient integration of 
refugees may in fact make for untenable means through which one granted asylum would be 
able to reimburse a state for. The ultimate question in observation here is: If the goal of 
asylum is to provide protection and a better standard of living for a fleeing migrant, then how 
can it be that one will receive this human right without full civic and economic inclusion? 
The double standards and openness of interpretation of the EU directives concerning basic 
rights and entitlements make for an unsustainable standard of living which very well could 
result in further forced migration, even if the cause of migration has transformed itself from 
fleeing persecution to fleeing unlivable economic standards. 
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 Another newly implemented approach to the CEAS is the European Integration Fund 
(EIF). This program is another more recent program which is similar to the ERF in that it is 
managed through shared competencies and is funded through allocated EU funds. The main 
goals of the fund are to better integrate non-EU citizens, which implicitly incorporates those 
who have been granted refuge by member states. The fund’s most recent term of disposable 
funds spans from 2008-2013 in excess of 825 million euros (considerably larger than the 
ERF – but one should keep in mind the expanded demographical interests the EU has in this 
field for the recipients of this fund are not only refugees and asylum-orientated institutions 
and instruments). In measuring the effectiveness of the CEAS, the EIF is crucial to a deeper 
understanding of European interests. 
 As previously mentioned, the EIF is not merely aimed towards refugees but does 
indeed include them as recipients of funds put forth to integration programs. Because of this 
over-arching purpose of the EIF, the objective outcomes and impacts the fund seeks to 
achieve are that of an economic benefit, not that of an overly normative objective of 
integrating cultures and fostering solidarity between naturals and foreigners. Quite the 
contrary, this component of EU efforts to integrate foreigners is to reach an economic 
outcome of inclusion thus resulting in greater labor supply, diverse supply of skills and 
experiences, and additional revenue from the taxes paid by immigrants. This is a clear-cut, 
rational aim of the EU for if immigrants remain unassimilated, they will ultimately remain 
expenditure. As long as the EU rhetoric concerning integration focuses particularly on the 
economic benefits while nations continue to see refugees as economic liabilities, the EIF will 
continue to feed this contradictory relationship. Certainly the economic benefits are just as 
available with refugees as they are with migrants of free will and volition. More so, the 
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socio-cultural benefits of integration of both free and forced migrants is of great benefice in 
that the diversity provided by foreigners has the capability to reiterate in a collective sense 
the very ethos Europe proclaims in its rhetoric concerning modern, democratic principles. 
 The efforts to integrate foreigners in both rational and normative terms in order to 
reach greater assimilation economically, socially, and cultural are not increasing 
effectiveness of the EU asylum system because it treats free migrants differently from 
refugees, and the directives concerning provisions do not have the power to converge 
national systems whereby refugees would be treated more equally and in a more coherent 
manner. As mentioned before, integration is the key final step to ensuring an effective 
asylum system for the main goal in providing international protection is to provide protection 
and a better standard of living than the original state a migrant has fled. If the EU cannot take 
more steps to ensure integration as a direct result of EU action (rather than abdication to 
national levels of governance), then regardless of how efficient the asylum system may be, it 
will fail to reach the end goal which is indeed the main reason why this twenty year endeavor 
has continued. 
  
Discussion and Conclusions: 
 Within the next years, the CEAS will inevitably continue to grow. As I have explored 
in this thesis, there is still much to correct if the system is to be effectively mitigate issues 
concerning human rights, efficiency of converged systems, and integration of immigrants. 
Much relies on the EU’s capacity to legislate more binding directives while also increasing 
oversight and enforcement of these protocols. After having explored these issues in greater 
depth, I argue that the current state of the CEAS is of low effectiveness in mitigating the 
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existing endogenous and exogenous challenges. It is imperative that the EU further invest in 
European level institutions and instruments, such as the ERF, EIF, and EASO while also 
seeking to differentiate and separate these structures from the national systems already in 
existence. The creation of new structures will be inevitable, but these structures ought not to 
be susceptible to the same political pathology deteriorating most of the CEAS: abdication of 
responsibility with the false perception that more restrictions bring forth less expenditure. In 
summation, the next policy cycle would be much more effective if convergence went beyond 
invitation, funding to EU endeavors were allocated and controlled fully by the EU itself, 
oversight and enforcement were increased with further involvement of third-party 
organizations as well as authorities controlled solely by the EU, and integration were 
recognized before, during, and after the asylum process takes place. To the last aspect listed 
in this broad prescription of plausible solutions, I remind the reader that the rights of all 
individuals remain and will continue to be the only real common denominator we as humans 
share. What a state can provide its own citizens, they most certainly can provide all, and 
more importantly, if this end is achieved, normative spill-over is the true end effect thus 
lessening the burden western states have already obliged themselves to take. 
 Asylum is by far one of the most complex issues governments are faced these days, 
and what should be simple in understanding (the need to protect those who cannot protect 
themselves) is indeed quite complicated when states confuse domestic priorities with 
collective, humanistic priorities. In order to better understand how states can more effectively 
govern the latter, the study of effectiveness of asylum systems is integral to these 
advancements and will without a doubt continue to be further developed in the decades to 
come. 
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